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Social Policies in the
World Bank
Paradigms and Challenges
A N T H O N Y  H A L L
London School of Economics, UK
abstract Social policies in the World Bank have evolved into three
conceptually and operationally separate agendas: social welfare, social
protection and social development. Welfare services and basic human
needs, as well as social protection in the form of safety nets and social
safeguards, together form the mainstay of what is generally regarded
within the organization as constituting social policy. Social
development reflects a broader if more fragmented view of social
policy. Bank specialists have recently sought to widen the definition of
social policy beyond welfare and protection, building upon long-
standing academic discourse in this field. However, in attempting to
pursue a more holistic and over-arching vision of social policy for
development, they are likely to encounter major internal obstacles.
Meeting this challenge will not be facilitated by the Bank
reorganization announced in June 2006, which may serve to restrict
the independence and remit of environmental and social specialists.
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Introduction
Despite its pioneering role in promoting international development, the World
Bank has not generally been considered a leading overt proponent of social pol-
icy. The word ‘overt’ is deliberately employed here because, to a greater or
lesser extent and in a variety of ways, the institution has clearly exercised a sig-
nificant influence on the design and execution of social policies in the South
(Deacon et al., 1997; Yeates, 2001). Yet it is only relatively recently that the term
‘social policy’ has entered the Bank lexicon. This delay should perhaps come as
no surprise considering the institution’s traditional mainstream emphasis on
infrastructural investment and macro-economic growth. Yet if ‘social policy’ is
conceptualized in broader terms than the conventional Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition of providing
statutory social services, it is evident that a diverse policy-relevant social agenda
has emerged within Bank operations over the past three decades. This has taken
the shape, for example, of (1) investments in key social sectors such as health,
education and pensions, (2) targeted anti-poverty programmes such as safety
nets, (3) the use of operational tools such as social assessments, poverty and
social impact analysis and poverty reduction strategy papers, and (4) social safe-
guards designed to mitigate the potentially harmful consequences of infrastruc-
ture projects. Whether applied via budget support through sector-wide loans
(SWAPs) or through specific projects and programmes, social instruments with
policy relevance may thus take various forms.
In this context, the article has three aims: (1) to disaggregate strands of
‘social policy’ (in broad terms) thinking and practice within the current work
of the World Bank, (2) to consider what conceptual, operational and organi-
zational factors underpin these divisions, and (3) to assess potential implica-
tions for the future of social policy within the Bank.
In World Bank operations, ‘social development’ has become common cur-
rency and now has its own Board-approved strategy, Empowering People by
Transforming Institutions (World Bank, 2005a). At the same time, as noted ear-
lier, social analysis at micro, sector and macro levels has become an integral
part of Bank work. Yet the specific term ‘social policy’ has been employed
infrequently. Related terms such as ‘human development’, ‘social protection’
and ‘social safeguards’ are employed instead. These labels reflect the histori-
cal accumulation of a diverse social agenda within the Bank during its lifetime,
reflecting critical junctures in policy making. They refer to a range of social
activities that have been developed in different (often competing) segments of
the organization, each performing distinctive functions in response to specific
operational needs and as the result of organizational restructuring.
Social Policies in the World Bank: Evolving Agendas
Three basic strands of social policy are observable in the work of the World
Bank (illustrated in Figure 1). Two of these are well established (social welfare
and social protection) while the putative third element (social development) is
of more recent origin. They may be summarized thus:
• Social welfare. Following mainstream development traditions, social policy
in the Bank is often equated with the provision of social welfare services
in the areas of education, health, nutrition, population and social security
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including pensions. The underlying rationale is enhancing human capital
to boost macro-economic growth, which has its intellectual origins in
modernization theory. It also reflects the Basic Human Needs approach
to poverty alleviation established in the 1980s (Stewart, 1985).
• Social protection. In the wake of structural adjustment and the move
towards the construction of social safety nets targeted at the poorest
groups, social policy in the Bank is increasingly seen as being synonymous
with social protection. Although social safety nets have long formed part
of social policy in OECD and other countries, they are becoming popu-
lar with the Bank and its clients as a tool for tackling absolute poverty.
They include measures such as social funds and conditional cash transfer
(CCT) programmes. This second broad category also embraces the
Bank’s safeguards policies (for example on environmental impacts, invol-
untary resettlement and protection of indigenous groups). Designed to
minimize the potentially negative impacts of Bank-funded projects upon
local populations, these safeguards are sometimes referred to internally as
‘do-no-harm’ social policies. For most Bank staff, therefore, social policy
is reduced either to welfare and basic needs provision or the protection of
vulnerable groups through safety nets and safeguards.
• Social development. There is, however, a third category of Bank activity that
accounts for a major portion of Bank funding and which has major social
ramifications. It includes substantial work programmes or clusters of proj-
ects around themes such as community-driven development, social account-
ability, conflict prevention, and participation and civic engagement, among
others. This is a loosely grouped social agenda which has evolved incre-
mentally in an ad hoc fashion as a result of internal restructuring and com-
petition for resources rather than following any clear rational. The Social
Development Strategy (World Bank, 2005a) represents an attempt to pro-
vide some coherence to this agenda. These three facets of Bank social pol-
icy will now be discussed in more detail.
Social Policy as Welfare
Arguably one of the major twin pillars of what many regard as the Bank’s con-
tribution to social policy is investment in education, health, population and
nutrition, which falls under the Human Development network (Figure 1).
Education and health investments commenced in the 1960s as part of the eco-
nomic modernization framework, intellectually underpinned by human capi-
tal theory (Becker, 1964). During the presidency of Robert MacNamara
(1968–81), a third of the Bank’s loan portfolio by value was dedicated to anti-
poverty initiatives in rural development, health, education and population
projects. However, these were still consistent with the Bank’s mainstream
focus on economic growth (Ayres, 1984).
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Under Tom Clausen (1981–6), influenced by the conservatism of Reagan
and Thatcher as well as disillusionment within the Bank over the apparent
failure of MacNamara’s anti-poverty programme to produce visible results,
the emphasis on direct poverty reduction through social investments tem-
porarily diminished as the role of the private sector was heightened and eco-
nomic growth was once again prioritized (Ayres, 1984). However, the
momentum of support continued for pursuing short-term welfare objectives
and investment in human resources with a poverty focus (for example through
primary and basic education, primary health care and nutrition projects),
which were seen as essential for supporting growth and productivity. Building
upon the human capital concept of the 1950s and 1960s, it was argued that
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investment in education, health and other social sectors produced high rates
of return. Meeting Basic Human Needs was thus a corollary to economic
growth strategies as doubts over the validity of ‘trickle down’ assumptions
were constantly raised (Stewart, 1985). These goals were reflected in the third
World Development Report, which identified ‘human development’ as a
process that could reconcile welfare and growth as complimentary rather than
contradictory agendas (World Bank, 1980).1
Clausen’s successor, Barber Conable (1986–91), oversaw a Bank ‘rededica-
tion’ to pro-welfare and anti-poverty measures in Bank policy (Kapur et al.,
1997). Flying in the face of opposition from the US administration, the Bank
drew up a new Core Poverty Program (CPP) to tackle hunger in Africa and to
deal with the social costs of adjustment. Buttressed by support from UNICEF
and the call for ‘adjustment with a human face’ (Cornia et al., 1987), the Bank
focused on constructing ‘safety nets’ using social emergency programmes and
social action funds. At the same time, the message was reinforced that invest-
ment in human resources through health, education and population pro-
grammes was good for growth. The Bank’s 13th World Development Report
(WDR) on the theme of Poverty focused on promoting the productivity of the
poor while providing them with basic social services, especially education,
complemented by programmes of targeted transfers and safety nets (World
Bank, 1990). A decade later, the WDR on Attacking Poverty preached empow-
erment of the poor through decentralization in the implementation of social
services such as health and education. This would, it was argued, make State
and social institutions more responsive to the needs of the poor, while build-
ing assets and introducing insurance mechanisms and targeted transfers to
offer protection against risks and shocks (World Bank, 2001).
Some middle-income countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, Taiwan and
South Korea, have been comparatively successful in advancing the principle
of more universal welfare service provision. Most nations in the South, how-
ever, are still characterized by limited access to poor quality services and selec-
tive benefits. This comprises a mixture of residual provision, focusing on
social pathologies, together with incremental service expansion driven by the
political demands of urban middle and organized working classes rather than
broader social needs. In Brazil, for example, the social budget strongly subsi-
dizes wealthier elite and middle-class groups through State funding for higher
education and civil service pensions (Hall, 2003, 2006).
The welfare ethos of State provision was challenged in the 1980s by the New
Right, which induced an ideological mistrust of government (Friedman and
Friedman, 1980; Murray, 1984). The State was now portrayed as paternalist
and repressive, its direct control to be reduced in favour of greater freedom of
choice for individuals. Furthermore, it was seen as necessary to contain public
spending and shift a larger share of the cost burden onto service consumers. To
meet these two goals, economic liberalization and deregulation meant the
growing privatization of public services along with reliance on the creation of
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markets and internal quasi-markets to boost efficiency in the allocation and
spending of resources. The Bank played a leading role during the 1990s in
pushing forward the ‘Washington Consensus’ package of privatization and
state deregulation of welfare service provision (Williamson, 1990).
Yet market solutions in social provision have proved highly contentious.
The charging of user fees in health and education, advocated by the Bank and
other international organizations during the 1990s, has often been counter-
productive and acted as a rationing mechanism that limits access by the poor.
In the primary education sector, disquiet over the effects of privatization on
access and the subsequent withdrawal of school fees on equity grounds has
helped fuel a massive expansion in enrolments in Uganda and Malawi, for
example, although improvements in education quality have lagged behind
(World Bank, 2006a). Due to public resource constraints and fiscal reforms,
private, out-of-pocket payments comprise a major source of revenue for
health financing, 80% in the case of India, for example. However, user fee
policies in the health sector are judged to have been a failure generally speak-
ing as they are regressive and discriminate against the poor (Bhatia and
Mossialos, 2004).
The privatization of pensions in developing countries, encouraged by the
Bank from the 1980s, demonstrates a similar record. From 1984–2004, the
Bank assisted 68 countries with pension reform through over 200 loan oper-
ations. A multi-pillar strategy was promoted based on a combination of pub-
licly and, in particular, privately funded mandatory and voluntary plans
(World Bank, 1994, 2000). Yet in the face of high costs, low returns and lim-
ited coverage, the experiment is now considered by even the Bank itself to
have been a failure (Gill et al., 2005). A recent Bank evaluation admitted that
over-preoccupation with fiscal sustainability had obscured poverty reduction
and protection goals, and that this approach had not considered policies to
protect those vulnerable elderly not covered by public pension schemes
(World Bank, 2006b).
Of the three social policy related themes identified in this article, those wel-
fare inputs provided through the Human Development (HD) network form
the most prominent within the Bank’s operations. In fiscal year 2005, it
accounted for 13% of total Bank lending (US$2.95bn), compared with 8%
(US$1.19bn) in 2000. Table 1 illustrates the steep rise in HD investments,
annual spending having increased by 148% in the space of 5 years to 2005.
Budgetary constraints have led to a slight decrease in annual HD expenditure
since the peak year of 2003 (US$3.37bn). Of total ‘social policy’ spending
within the Bank, HD accounts for 44% (Table 1 and Figure 3). HD is respon-
sible for 14% of the Bank’s US$95.4bn in net loan commitments, the second
largest after Financial and Private Sector Development (Figure 4). In addition
to its financial significance, the Human Development network commands a
strong political position within the Bank. It is home to a large proportion of
staff economists and enjoys a reputation for technical strength.
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Social Policy as Protection
The second distinctive category of ‘social policy’ within Bank operations
includes measures to protect the weak and vulnerable. This is accomplished
either through (1) social investments carefully targeted at the poor or (2)
environmental and social safeguard policies designed to mitigate the poten-
tially harmful impacts of Bank-funded infrastructure projects. The first group
of social investments falls largely under the Social Protection Unit, set up in
2001 within the Human Development network (Figure 1). This includes
labour market interventions, natural disaster management, social risk mitiga-
tion, safety nets, vulnerability assessment and monitoring as well as social
insurance and pensions.
Having emerged in the context of structural adjustment during the 1980s
and 1990s, safety nets have become an increasingly popular policy instrument
in the Bank. They now account for almost a quarter of the Bank’s active social
protection projects and total commitments of almost US$6bn.2 They include
cash and conditional income transfers, food programmes, price subsides and
micro-credit as well as school vouchers and fee waivers for health care serv-
ices. The Bank claims to have gone beyond mere social protection in its Social
Risk Management framework, aiming to build livelihood capacity over the
longer term. This involves three strategies to deal with risk and vulnerability
(prevention, mitigation and coping) within a multi-institutional approach
(World Bank, 2000).
The strength of the Social Protection (SP) portfolio within the Bank is
illustrated by the fact that in 2005 it accounted for 36% of ‘social policy’
spending, having more than doubled in size since 2002 (Table 1 and Figure 2).
However, this proportion has dropped slightly since 2000, when SP
accounted for almost half of the total, and as HD has expanded in relative
terms over the same period (Figure 3). In 2005, SP was responsible for 7% of
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table 1 World Bank lending by social policy-related major themes, 2000–5 (US$millions)
Theme 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Human 1190 1134 1756 3374 3079 2951
development
Social protection 1895 1651 1086 2324 1577 2437
Social 800 1469 1385 1003 1557 1285
development
Total social policy 3885 4254 4227 6701 6213 6673
spending
Total World 15,276 17,250 19,519 18,513 20,079 22,307
Bank lending
Source: World Bank (2005e: 57).
the Bank’s active project portfolio of US$95.4bn (Figure 4). In 2005 HD and
SP together accounted for 21% of Bank lending.
Social protection has acquired its prominent place in the Bank’s work pro-
gramme largely as a result of having to deal with the consequences of eco-
nomic stabilization and structural adjustment. Far from being self-rectifying
under adjustment, as had originally been predicted, poverty and vulnerability
were exacerbated in many countries and for many groups. Welfare provision
was heavily compromised, with politically ‘soft’ targets such as health and pri-
mary education often bearing the brunt of spending cutbacks (Graham-
Brown, 1991; Kanji and Manji, 1991). In policy making, emphasis was placed
on the creation of safety nets using social funds to target scarce resources at
poorer, more vulnerable groups (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997; Subbarao, 1997).
The collapse of the Soviet Union and comprehensive social security schemes
in the former communist countries, the East Asia crisis and economic prob-
lems in Russia and Brazil during 1997–8 led to the introduction of large-scale,
targeted social protection measures with Bank assistance. Yet, as already
noted, attempts to privatize social services and introduce user fees has met
with very limited success.
Nowadays, CCT programmes have become increasingly popular with both
the Bank and its client governments as a form of social protection. As far as
the Bank is concerned, CCTs have several advantages. They allow the poor to
158 Global Social Policy 7(2)
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be targeted quite effectively and comparatively quickly, with benefits being
directly channelled to vulnerable groups such as women and children, while
generating additional benefits through education and health conditionalities
(Coady et al., 2004; Rawlings, 2004). Evaluations of Mexico’s Oportunidades
programme (formerly known as PROGRESA), show that education, health
and nutrition components have had a significant positive impact on welfare
and human capital (Skoufias, 2005). CCT programmes are also attractive to
portfolio managers due to the frequently large size of loans involved, since
professional success is judged at least in part by financial turnover. Brazil’s
Bolsa Familia programme, for example, has been allocated total funding of
US$2.6bn by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.
CCTs are also popular with borrowers, not only because they boost govern-
ment revenues, but also because they enable ruling parties to strengthen their
political support at the ballot box, as illustrated quite clearly in the case of Brazil
during the presidential elections of October 2006 (Coady et al., 2004; Hall,
2006; Pritchett, 2005). In many Latin American countries, CCTs are becoming
a cornerstone of social policy, popular across the ideological spectrum due to
their wide political appeal.3 Bank and borrowers thus have a mutual interest in
adopting these social protection policies. Such a convergence of views on the
Hall: Social Policies in the World Bank 159
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000 2005
Social Development Social Protection
Human Development
figure 3 World Bank lending for social policy-related themes: 2000 and 2005 (%)
Source: World Bank (2005e: 57).
value of CCTs challenges the ‘strong globalization’ view of powerful interna-
tional interests overriding national sovereignty, at least in this particular sector
(Deacon et al., 1997; Yeates, 2001). This suggests that, for both reasons of eco-
nomic austerity and political expediency, governments indeed know what they
are doing in moving towards more selective, residual policies and perhaps away
from the principle of universal provision.
Social safeguards may also be included in this second ‘social policy’ category
since they too have been designed to protect vulnerable groups against the
negative consequences of development policy, in this case the potential
impacts of Bank-funded schemes. The first of the Bank’s social safeguard poli-
cies were introduced in the 1980s to protect local populations such as the
involuntarily displaced and indigenous groups against the adverse conse-
quences of infrastructure schemes, typically dam and highway construction.4
Until mid-2006, social safeguards were the prime responsibility of the Social
Development  (SDV) department, part of the Environmentally and Socially
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Sustainable Development (ESSD) network, set up as a consequence of the
1997 Bank reorganization. Safeguards form one of the main business areas of
cross-sector support to other departments for Bank anthropologists and sim-
ilar social development specialists. No specific funding figures are available
for safeguards policies but their application is strategically vital in project
implementation and they enjoy a high profile, being subjected to considerable
scrutiny from outside the Bank.
One unfortunate consequence of introducing such preventive measures is
that safeguards-based social policy has, as noted earlier, become equated with
a ‘do-no-harm’ approach to development. Social experts in this field are often
informally likened within Bank circles to an internal police force employed to
keep their colleagues under surveillance and minimize any potential damage
that projects such as large-scale infrastructure development might cause. The
perception that social scientists are a thorn in the side of those striving to
implement mainstream Bank business in a timely fashion has been difficult to
shake off and still persists quite strongly within the bureaucracy, as a recent
evaluation demonstrated (World Bank, 2005b).
Social Policy as Social Development
The third pillar of social action within the Bank comprises a loosely articulated
set of activities that falls mainly under the aegis of the Social Development
(SDV) department, formerly housed within the Environmentally and Socially
Sustainable Development (ESSD) network and, since June 2006, part of the
Sustainable Development Network (SDN). However, the Poverty Reduction
and Economic Management (PREM) network, which deals with mainstream
macro-economic policy, has also acquired partial responsibility for several
‘social’ components that would under normal circumstances be the responsi-
bility of SDV; for example, empowerment, social capital and gender (Figure 1). 
Social aspects of Bank operations were first explicitly addressed in the early
1970s and the first rural sociologists were hired in 1974 with a view to improv-
ing project effectiveness. Early work focused on anthropology and project
operations (Cochrane and Naronha, 1973), sociological variables in develop-
ment (Cernea, 1985), participant observation (Salmen, 1987), involuntary
resettlement (Cernea, 1988), indigenous peoples, women and institutions, nat-
ural resource management and social assessment (Perrett and Lethem, 1980).
The 1987 Bank reorganization involved setting up Environment Units in each
of the four regions, which incorporated social scientists as well as environmen-
talists. While this reflected growing general concern over the environment
within the Bank, the restructuring was mainly in response to widespread
adverse publicity received by the Bank within the USA and globally at the
hands of a vigorous non-governmental organization (NGO) and media cam-
paign following the catastrophic impacts of major projects, in particular the
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Northwest Amazon settlement project (Polonoroeste) in Brazil, among others,
during the early 1980s (Redwood, 1993; Rich, 1994; Wade, 1997). The US
Congress and US Treasury Department also played prominent roles in bring-
ing about these changes.5 In 1993, a Social Policy and Resettlement Division
was set up in the then Environmentally Sustainable Development (ESD)
department with six staff and an anthropologist as division chief. Key Bank fig-
ures such as Michael Cernea, Scott Guggenheim, Gloria Davis and Robert
Goodland drove forward the introduction of environmental and social safe-
guard policies while strengthening the use of social analysis in project design
and appraisal (Davis, 2002).
A major watershed was reached in 1996 when newly appointed Bank
President James Wolfensohn set up a Social Development Task Force to con-
sider the role of social assessment in Bank operations. The Strategic Compact
of 1997 involved management reorganization, decentralization of operations
to country offices and the introduction of new communications technologies
and staff training (Mallaby, 2004). A new Environmentally and Socially
Sustainable Development (ESSD) network with its own vice-president was
set up, including a central Social Development (SDV) department, and
expertise also allocated to regional departments. As in 1987, reorganization a
decade later was sparked in large measure by conflicts between the Bank and
civil society organizations, partly as a consequence of the general ‘Fifty Years
is Enough’ campaign and partly as a response to specific complaints at the
subordination of environmental and social considerations in lending opera-
tions on a number of high-profile projects.6 The Bank’s social development
agenda also received a boost in 1999 from Wolfensohn’s personal commit-
ment to a ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’. This stressed the
importance of local participation, empowerment and an enhanced role for
civil society, providing an appropriate context for the adoption of Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers in debt negotiations (Mallaby, 2004). Multi-mil-
lion dollar trust funds to support social development projects were established
by Japanese and European donors that provided additional funds to support
the social development portfolio.
These changes helped to strengthen the role of ‘social’ expertise within the
organization. From just a handful of social scientists employed in the early
1990s, a decade later the picture had changed considerably. By 2002, some
200 social development professionals were employed by the Bank either as
staff or short-term consultants with another 250 or so Bank staff holding post-
graduate degrees in non-economic social sciences (World Bank, 2005b).
However, although this expansion in social expertise mirrors the growth in
Bank lending, social experts are still relatively few in number compared with
staff economists, especially in country offices.
This steady expansion is highly significant in operational terms, but there is
still no single, commonly accepted definition in the Bank of what constitutes
‘social development’. The social development portfolio has grown in a largely
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incremental manner, and perhaps this was inevitable given the eclectic nature
of the subject and the historical context within which it evolved. According to
the Bank’s own evaluation, the organization’s social development work ‘is
often characterized by what it does, rather than what it is’, and it remains a
‘fuzzy concept’ (World Bank, 2005b: xiv, 2). Surveys have revealed that many
SDV staff themselves do not consider the group’s goals to be well defined.
The SDV work programme falls into several major and evolving ‘business
lines’, comprising clusters of projects around social themes that have been
nurtured since the 1990s. This very mixed group includes community-driven
development (CDD), participation and civic engagement, culture, indigenous
peoples, conflict prevention and reconstruction, youth, and social accounta-
bility. In addition, as already noted, SDV provides social analysis inputs
through a range of tools applied at project, sector and (more recently) at coun-
try levels, delivered largely as cross-sector support to other country and the-
matic departments (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Poverty and Social
Impact Analysis,7 Country Social Analysis,8 etc.). At the same time, however,
SDV itself has only a very small free-standing project portfolio of its own
(World Bank, 2005b). This limited ‘ownership’ has, according to some inter-
nal observers, contributed to the political vulnerability of SDV within the
Bank’s hierarchy.
Yet this social ‘pillar’ has collectively become involved in an increasingly
large proportion of the Bank’s lending portfolio. In the 1980s, investments
with some support for social development were responsible for just 5% of
lending, rising to 15% by 1994 (World Bank, 2005b). From 2000 to 2005,
Social Development saw its lending increase by 38%, from US$800m to
US$1285m (Table 1). As shown in Figure 3, its share of the current ‘social pol-
icy’ agenda in the Bank (21%) remains significantly lower than either Human
Development (44%) or Social Protection (36%). However, as demonstrated in
Figure 4, within the Bank’s total active project portfolio, Social Development
fares relatively well at 9%, compared with HD (14%) and SP (7%).
Yet despite this expansion of budgets and personnel, the ‘social’ presently
seems to be in a similar position to that occupied by the ‘environmental’ in the
early 1980s within the Bank. Although social issues are highlighted as critical
and much progress has been made in carving out a social agenda, the ‘social’ has
not yet entered the mainstream of Bank operations. Social assessment of proj-
ects, for example, unlike environmental assessment, is not mandatory unless
safeguard policies such as those for resettlement and indigenous peoples are
triggered.9 In all other projects, decisions whether to include social analysis are
taken largely at the discretion of team leaders, as had been the case with envi-
ronmental screening before 1987. Decisions whether to adopt non-mandatory
procedures are conditioned by factors such as the task manager’s appreciation of
their importance, budgetary and personnel constraints as well as the assessment
of risk in terms of potential internal repercussions. This is despite the
now widely accepted positive association between the incorporation of social
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dimensions and subsequent project performance (Cernea, 1985; World Bank,
2005b).
There are many reasons for this state of affairs. In addition to the dominance
of macro-economists within the Bank there is, as already noted, a widespread
perception that non-economic social scientists (especially anthropologists and
sociologists) perform essentially policing or remedial roles. They are often still
seen as something of a hindrance to the institution’s ‘real’ business of develop-
ment, with objections on social grounds only serving to slow down the process
of loan approval and disbursement. There is thus a clear tension in Bank oper-
ations between the desire for quantity (i.e. project turnover, the imperative to
spend allocated funds speedily and present projects for Board approval in a
timely fashion) on the one hand and, on the other, the need to improve quality
(i.e. minimizing negative social impacts and improving project fit). While Bank
managers tend to prioritize project disbursements and financial turnover,
social development specialists have to counterbalance this with the considera-
tions of quality assurance and safeguards. In the process, however, this often
creates a negative internal backlash.
Furthermore, the Bank’s internal labour market mechanism does not
encourage technical staff to be outspoken, quite the contrary. Apart from
departmental and sector managers who are wholly or partially paid for through
guaranteed ‘core’ funding, technical specialists are obliged to sell their 42 staff
weeks a year against specific projects (each with its own budget code), whether
operational or research. Task managers are reluctant to purchase the services
of those with a reputation for being ‘awkward’ or ‘difficult’. This is especially
true once a project has passed the concept phase and is under preparation. A
task manager’s kudos is measured via the efficiency with which he or she can
get projects approved by the Board, not necessarily in terms of project quality.
Objections on social grounds can increase operational costs and cause delays in
implementation. Professional survival in the Bank depends on maintaining
one’s marketability. With no guaranteed funding, a social specialist who can-
not pay his or her way enjoys extremely poor job prospects in the Bank. This
vulnerability has been reinforced by the growing tendency to hire social spe-
cialists on short-term, temporary contracts, which offer even less stability and
make staff even more cautious, inducing much self-censorship.
There are other reasons for the sometimes indifferent impact of social
experts in the Bank. In spite of the increased numbers of social scientists
among Bank staff, there are still far too few to do justice to the potential work-
load. The services of social specialists either from SDV (at the ‘centre’) or the
country departments (in the ‘regions’) are in constant demand to provide
cross-support to projects in all divisions. This skills shortage is especially
marked in Bank field offices in country and task teams. Here, there tends to
be a strong reliance on short-term consultants to provide necessary social
inputs but it is debatable whether these have the same clout as internal con-
tributions that can be followed through by permanent staff.
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A major contributory factor that works against social mainstreaming,
however, has its origins in the 1997 organizational restructuring of the Bank,
mentioned earlier. This introduced a cross-cutting matrix system involving
thematic and regional networks. Operations staff are generally ‘mapped’ to
both a thematic group (such as HD, PREM or SDV) as well as to a region
(Latin America, Africa, etc.). This has resulted in the institutional separation
of social concerns among three vice-presidencies; namely, HD, PREM and
ESSD (now merged into the SDN). With the transfer in 2006 of responsibil-
ity for social safeguards from SDV to yet another vice-presidency for
Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS), the social agenda now cuts
across four separate Bank networks (Figure 1).
The bureaucratic separation of social policy concerns is reinforced by both
conceptual and operational divisions. Conceptually, social investment is seen
within HD both in terms of supporting macro-economic growth and provid-
ing social protection to the poor and vulnerable. To a large extent, this is also
the view within PREM with its overriding concern for macro-economic
growth and poverty alleviation. In principle, the Bank’s social protection poli-
cies have evolved considerably and now go well beyond the construction of
temporary safety nets to incorporate risk prevention and mitigation strategies
that strengthen people’s longer-term capacities to ward off poverty and
expand their opportunities (World Bank, 2000, 2005c). Yet in practice social
protection policies, which account for about a third of the ‘social’ agenda
Bank budget, are still heavily characterized by measures to safeguard incomes
and consumption through measures such as conditional cash transfers rather
than being instruments for encouraging longer term social investment
(Britto, 2005; Hall, 2006). SDV, in contrast, tends to view social investments
as vehicles for advancing not just material but also non-material progress
measured in terms of indicators such as participation and empowerment, cul-
tural integrity, social integration, social accountability and citizenship rights.
However, the sheer breadth, diversity and somewhat eclectic nature of the
SDV social agenda makes it difficult to encompass all aspects within a clear,
single definition, despite the attempt to formulate a Social Development
Strategy (World Bank, 2005a).
Thus, in the eyes of most Bank professionals, welfare and protection com-
prise the organization’s contribution to what is considered mainstream ‘social
policy’ within the organization. In this view, the ‘social’ components of devel-
opment are reduced in the main to deliverable goods and services such as wel-
fare sector investments or risk-mitigating and targeted interventions. This
dominant perception is clearly demonstrated for example in the Bank’s
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) documents, which regularly map out
strategic priorities and plans for Bank operations in client countries. Here,
social policy is invariably perceived as being synonymous with the provision
of social services and safety nets, with a growing enthusiasm for conditional
cash transfer schemes. There is little attempt to systematically harmonize and
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integrate wider social development actions alongside and as an integral part
of the process of macro-economic development (Midgely, 1995). The third
branch of ‘social development’ remains highly fragmented, lacking in concep-
tual coherence and politically vulnerable within the Bank.
Given the organizational separation among networks, matched in some
measure by different intellectual understandings of what constitutes ‘social
policy’ in the Bank, it is inevitable that significant constraints on operational
cooperation should appear. Competition over access to financial and staff
resources will flourish (the infamous ‘turf wars’), especially where there are
few if any incentives that encourage cross-departmental collaboration. For
example, SDV and PREM have been known to compete vigorously over the
‘ownership’ of social business lines, including the right to lead in the imple-
mentation of anti-poverty instruments such as Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSPs) and Poverty and Social Impact Analyses (PSIAs), gender
analysis and civil society policy. The fact that a department’s kudos is judged
by the size of its own-managed portfolio rather than by its participation in
cross-sector collaboration, even when the latter can be measured, leads to
open competition over project ownership. Social development specialists
resent the fact that their cross-sector inputs to projects are often ‘hidden’ in
project budgets ‘owned’ by another (lead) department and are not given due
acknowledgement. Such internal progress indicators as portfolio project size
and financial turnover strongly influence staff promotion prospects, serving
to reinforce interdepartmental competition further still.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
The social dimensions of development have been addressed by the Bank in a
variety of ways and in response to many stimuli, both internal and external to
the institution. This diversity is reflected in the range of social policies pur-
sued and their spread across the organization, leading to a high degree of staff
frustration at the lack of cross-sector collaboration and frequent competition,
even outright conflict, over access to financial and human resources. This
fragmentation of social agendas has provoked a rethink among social scien-
tists concerned with reaching a new understanding of what should be
regarded as ‘social policy’ in the 21st century. Such preoccupations generated
a major Bank conference in December 2005 to explore ‘New Frontiers of
Social Policy’, which brought together a wide range of development profes-
sionals and academics. Its concluding statement declared that, ‘ … social pol-
icy should not fall into the trap of one-size-fits-all prescriptions … [and that
we must] … augment existing social policies by greater attention to employ-
ment (livelihoods), social integration and institutions’ (World Bank, 2005d: 1).
Indeed, this message rather belatedly reflects long-standing concerns outside
the Bank in academia on the limited relevance of the OECD social policy
model for developing countries and of the need for a more holistic view of
human welfare needs.
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State welfare programmes in Latin America, for example, have been heavily
criticized for reinforcing existing economic and social inequalities and doing
little to promote redistribution or growth (Abel and Lewis, 2002). It is increas-
ingly recognized in policy circles that social provision can be met through a
variety of statutory and non-statutory means and via a range of institutions and
actors at all levels of society from the household and community through to
local, regional, domestic and international arenas. Academic social policy spe-
cialists have for some time been delivering this message (De Haan, 2000;
Devereau and Cook, 2000; Hall and Midgley, 2004; Kabeer, 2004; Kennett,
2004; Institute of Development Studies [IDS], 2006). At the same time, the
UN has also underscored the need for a wider approach through its research
programme on ‘Social Policy in a Development Context’ (Mkandawire, 2004).
The notion of ‘welfare regimes’ attempts to capture diverse paradigms through
which needs in developing and transition countries are met by combinations of
support through the State, market and community (Gough and Wood, 2004).
In academic and practitioner circles, and more recently within the Bank
itself, initiatives are thus underway to extend the boundaries of social policy. In
a developing country context, for example, it is argued that social policy should
be more clearly linked to promoting economic development. Welfare develop-
mentalism was strong in Germany, Sweden and Finland, where social insur-
ance and investment schemes were designed to stimulate economic growth.
The experiences of South Korea and Taiwan as well as Singapore and Hong
Kong, which successfully developed and applied broad-based social policies,
show that such a paradigm is valid and feasible to apply, albeit under special cir-
cumstances that may not be easily replicable elsewhere (Kwon, 2004).
One attempt to link social policy with economic development in the South has
revolved around the concept of livelihoods. The Department for International
Development (DFID)-funded ‘Social Policy Research Programme’ at the IDS,
for example, has adapted the Sustainable Livelihoods approach to focus on
people’s livelihood strategies at different levels, analysing the ‘broader institu-
tional configuration of social provisioning which prevailed in different contexts
and … the extent to which it addressed the needs of the poor’ (Kabeer, 2004: 3).
It distinguishes between three ‘social’ domains; reproduction of life, reproduc-
tion of labour and reproduction of society. The biological and social reproduc-
tion of human beings embraces social policy as the provision of care services.
Labour reproduction involves boosting economic productivity through health
and education investments. This wider vision implies moving away from seeing
social protection as simply a short-term welfare measure and towards a longer-
term security perspective, involving livelihoods strengthening and the adoption
of a rights-based approach (IDS, 2006). In a similarly broad fashion, Moser
(2006) has developed an assets-based approach that aims to place social policy in
the mainstream of poverty reduction debates.
The third dimension outlined in the IDS schema expands the remit of social
policy to the macro and global levels. Reproduction of societal relations relate
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to the ideological and material conditions that form the basis of society,
embracing ‘the full range of institutional structures within a society [and
implying a] broad understanding of “the social” as an aspect of development
policy’. This approach to social policy ‘detaches it from its moorings in par-
ticular sectors, programmes and projects and widens it to encompass the pur-
posive efforts made by a range of public actors in a society, guided by some
vision of “the social”, to influence the processes by which life, labour and
social relationships are reproduced within that society’ (Kabeer, 2004: 10–11).
Consonant with this broader vision, the Bank’s concept note for Arusha
declared that: ‘A more holistic approach to social policy in development con-
texts, where markets are grossly imperfect and labor markets often incom-
plete, would seek to promote policies, institutions and programs that balance
a concern for equity and social justice with the concern for economic growth.’
Social policy is defined as, ‘public policies aimed at three levels: promoting
equality of opportunity to benefit individuals (micro-level), equality of agency
and institutional reform to benefit groups (meso-level), and horizontal and
vertical social integration to benefit society (macro-level)’, which would seek
to ‘offset inequities in asset endowment with equitable opportunities for asset
creation and livelihoods’ (Dani, 2005: 2–3).
It remains to be seen whether macro social policy that incorporates and
builds upon broader notions of social development will take hold in the World
Bank. However, in pushing forward this agenda, if indeed it does go forward,
the Bank faces a number of challenges; these are conceptual, operational and
political in nature. The first challenge is to overcome the narrow conceptual-
ization of social policy as being limited to welfare services and social protec-
tion. This would entail close collaboration between the Bank and the
academic community to define a framework capable of embracing these par-
adigms within a wider view that links social policy to livelihoods, well-being
and economic development more generally. Many staff would resist the inter-
nalization of such ideas on the grounds that it is not within the Bank’s remit
and that the institution should limit itself to its conventional project portfolio.
Furthermore, with the recent emphasis on infrastructure investments in
official declarations under the new presidency, such ‘soft’ social concerns
seem even less likely to command either political legitimacy or budgetary
allocations.
Yet the conceptual challenge, while formidable, is in some respects the least
difficult obstacle to overcome. Even if a mutually acceptable definition of social
policy is indeed eventually reached, it will amount to little unless it is able to
inform Bank operations. Welfare service provision and social protection are rel-
atively easy to define and implement within the Bank’s present organizational
set-up and both enjoy strong internal political support. The institutional sepa-
ration of responsibilities for these areas sets out a fairly clear division of labour
and delineation of turf boundaries, despite some encroachment. However, this
also leads to internecine conflicts and a lack of active collaboration among
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departments with different social agendas as they compete internally for scarce
human and financial resources in the struggle for kudos and internal authority.
The challenge, therefore, would be to find ways of facilitating cross-sector
collaboration within an overarching social policy framework. This would nec-
essarily involve a degree of institutional restructuring together with a re-
examination of incentives relating to allocation of funding, to staff promotion
prospects and employment security, and to other matters that could help to
foster a more collaborative work environment. Paradoxically, however, recent
surveys show that the majority of Bank staff working with social issues remain
firmly opposed to the suggestion that groups should be merged to facilitate
integration of social policy agendas. This negative attitude is attributed vari-
ously to ‘change fatigue’, to a general lack of credibility in Bank capacity to
get the structure right, and to the popular perception that economists will
always predominate in Bank business no matter what organizational changes
are made (World Bank, 2005b).
Conclusion
Even if a greater measure of conceptual and operational integration and
collaboration were possible in theory among the diverse arms of social policy
within the Bank, there remains a major practical obstacle to social policy
mainstreaming in the organization. Assuming that a more appropriate social
policy framework was defined, its effective implementation through Bank
operations would be contingent not just upon appropriate changes in organi-
zational and incentive structures, although these alone would require a radi-
cal rethink. Progress would, even more critically, be contingent on there
being clear political backing for strengthening and integrating the Bank’s
social agenda more systematically into mainstream operations.
However, the Bank reorganization announced in June 2006 does not augur
well for such change. To recap, the ESSD vice-presidency was abolished and
the network merged with Infastructure (INF) to form a new SDN. At the
same time, the environmental and social safeguards teams (in ENV and SDV)
were transferred from the former ESSD to a separate vice-presidency, OPCS.
The then bank president Paul Wolfowitz declared that, ‘The purpose of con-
solidating these two networks is to mainstream environmental issues, improve
synergies, better integrate core operations, and ensure that we strengthen our
focus on sustainability as we increase our investment in infrastructure’ (World
Bank, 2006c: 1).
The brief but pointed reference to infrastructure in this statement is signif-
icant. It reflects a feeling among some Bank staff that the institution should
return to its ‘core’ values of promoting economic modernization above all
else. Many argue that such a new emphasis would more accurately reflect
client country demands for heavy investment as a precursor for growth. It is
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also the product of disillusionment in some quarters with the record of ‘softer’
social investments in supporting the development process. Indeed, this dis-
course is reminiscent of that heard during the early 1980s when MacNamara’s
poverty agenda was eclipsed under Clausen by the return to a focus on
economic growth.
It is a moot point whether this most recent reorganization and emphasis
on infrastructure has been influenced by US foreign policy objectives, with
a possible desire to redirect Bank investments into eventual post-war recon-
struction efforts (in Iraq or Afghanistan, for example). The infamous debacle
involving Bank chief economist Joe Stiglitz, and Ravi Kanbur, director of the
WDR 2000, who both resigned in protest at alleged external ‘interference’
by the US Treasury, suggests that such a geo-political link is not outside the
realms of possibility.10 Indeed, as noted earlier, it is well known that pressure
from the US Treasury was a major factor in persuading the Bank to introduce
reforms in its environmental procedures and organizational structure from
1987.
Yet, while the full implications of these organizational changes will take
time to fully reveal themselves, outside observers have expressed serious con-
cerns that they might weaken environmental and social considerations,
including safeguards, and subsume them to the interests of infrastructure
investments (Bretton Woods, 2006). Under such circumstances, it is difficult
to imagine how a social policy agenda could grow within the organization, at
least for the foreseeable future. Indeed, it seems even less likely now than it
did a few years ago that preconditions exist for the expansion and consolida-
tion of social development and social policy within the World Bank.
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notes
1. During the 1980s under adjustment, welfare spending was doubly rewarding.
‘Killing two birds with one stone, social service projects were discovered to be a
powerful tool for the occasion: they served the adjustment, and thus the produc-
tivity and growth objective; and they served the equity and poverty objectives.’
(Kapur et al., 1997: Vol. 1, 349).
2. Projects and Operations data, World Bank, April 2006.
3. Apart from Brazil, CCT programmes have been introduced in Mexico, Chile,
Colombia, Nicaragua, Argentina and Ecuador (Rawlings, 2004).
4. The 10 safeguard policies now include environmental assessment, natural habi-
tats, pest management, involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, forests,
safety of dams, cultural property, projects in international waterways and projects
in disputed areas.
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5. Approved in 1981, Polonoroeste demonstrated such a catalogue of errors and
generated such protest that in 1985 the mid-term review recommended suspen-
sion of loan disbursements. These criticisms were made in the context of a much
wider, global wave of concern during the late 1980s over issues of environmental
management and sustainable development. Advocacy NGOs in the USA were
instrumental in placing evidence of the Bank’s poor record on environmental and
indigenous affairs before key congressional committees in 1983, culminating in a
list of recommendations calling upon the Bank and counterpart organizations to
strengthen their environmental (including social) procedures. In addition, there
was strong criticism from the powerful Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations. Most crucially, however, the US Treasury under James Baker
insisted that the Bank should ‘clean up its act’ as a precondition for approval of an
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) capital increase
and IDA replenishment (Wade, 1997).
6. These included the Sardar Sarovar dam project in India, the Chonoy dam in
Guatemala and the Bulyanhulu gold mine in Tanzania. Another case in point was
the Itaparica hydropower scheme in Northeast Brazil, which was reformulated to
allow for comprehensive resettlement provision following massive local and
international protests (Hall, 1994; Wade, 1997).
7. Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) analyses the distributional impact of
policy reforms on the well-being or welfare of different stakeholder groups, with
particular focus on the poor and vulnerable. It plays a growing role in the elabo-
ration and implementation of poverty reduction strategies in developing coun-
tries. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is designed to outline
poverty reduction goals as a condition of debt relief provided under the enhanced
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
8. The Country Social Analysis (CSA) takes a broader view of the social, economic
and political context of development within specific countries in order to inform
country operations and provide guidance on investment priorities.
9. Environmental review and clearance procedures became mandatory for all Bank
projects in 1987, and a portfolio of ‘environmental’ projects was established.
10. Chief economist Joe Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur, director of the World Development
Report 2000, resigned (in 1999 and 2000 respectively) in protest at alleged interven-
tion by the US Treasury to influence the content of the WDR as well as other Bank
policy statements concerning the relative weight of civil society/anti-poverty vs eco-
nomic development/free market messages and priorities (Wade, 2001, 2002).
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résumé
Les Politiques Sociales dans la Banque Mondiale:
Les Paradigmes et Défis
Les politiques sociales de la Banque Mondiale ont évolué de façon conceptuelle et pra-
tique dans trois différentes directions: l’assistance sociale, la protection sociale et le
développement social. Les services de l’assistance sociale et les besoins fondamentaux,
ainsi que la protection sociale en tant que filets et garanties sociales, forment l’ensemble
de ce qui est généralement considéré dans l’organisation comme étant la composante de
la politique sociale. Le développement social reflète une vue plus large et plus fragmen-
tée de la politique sociale. Récemment, les spécialistes bancaires ont tenté d’élargir la
définition de la politique sociale au-delà du bien-être et de la protection, en se basant sur
un discours académique de longue date dans ce dossier. Cependant, en tentant de pour-
suivre une vision plus holistique et plus étendue du développement de la politique
sociale, ils risquent de rencontrer des obstacles internes majeurs. La réorganisation de la
Banque, annoncée en juin 2006, pourrait limiter son indépendance et le versement aux
spécialistes écologiques et sociaux, ce qui augmenterait le défi à surmonter.
resumen
Las Políticas Sociales del Banco Mundial:
Paradigmas y Desafíos
Las políticas sociales del Banco Mundial han evolucionado de manera conceptual y
operacional en tres direcciones diferentes: la asistencia social, la protección social y el
desarrollo social. Los servicios sociales y las necesidades humanas fundamentales, así
como la protección social en forma de redes de seguridad y de garantías sociales, forman
el pilar fundamental de lo que es generalmente contemplado dentro de la organización
como el componente fundamental de la política social. El desarrollo social refleja una
visión más amplia y más fragmentada de la política social. Los especialistas del Banco han
intentado recientemente ampliar la definición de la política social más allá del bienestar
y de la protección, basándose en un discurso académico consolidado desde hace algún
tiempo. Dichos especialistas, que intentan elaborar una visión más extensa del desarrollo
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de la política social, corren el riesgo de encontrar obstáculos internos serios. Entre esos
desafíos internos a los que tienen que hacer frente se encuentra la reorganización del
Banco Mundial, anunciada en junio de 2006, la cuál puede servir para restringir la inde-
pendencia de los especialistas sociales y del medio ambiente.
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